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 Zoning For Families  
SARA C. BRONIN* 
Is a group of eight unrelated adults and three children living together and sharing 
meals, household expenses, and responsibilities—and holding themselves out to the 
world to have long-term commitments to each other—a family? Not according to 
most zoning codes—including that of Hartford, Connecticut, where the preceding 
scenario presented itself a few years ago. Zoning, which is the local regulation of 
land use, almost always defines family, limiting those who may live in a dwelling unit 
to those who satisfy the zoning code’s definition. Often times, this definition is drafted 
in a way that excludes many modern living arrangements and preferences.  
This Article begins by exploring how zoning codes define both the family and the 
“functional family,” namely, a group of individuals living together like the Hartford 
group described above. The Article then carefully tracks judicial decisions that have 
rejected restrictive definitions of family and analyzes sociological and 
anthropological literature demonstrating that definitions excluding functional 
families are unreasonable as a matter of law. Based on the law as it has developed 
and demographic trends, my view is that governments must allow, but may regulate, 
functional families.  
The Article concludes with suggestions for local governments to revise their 
zoning codes to allow for functional families. In making these revisions, communities 
must weigh the real need to control density, the desire of functional families for 
privacy, and the urge to manage community character. Local governments who 
choose to regulate functional families may choose between three models of 
regulation: the density model, the privacy model, and the character model. Once 
decision-makers recognize these choices, they may more appropriately consider 
fellow community members’ increasingly diverse living arrangements and 
preferences—and better zone for families, whatever their modern form may entail.  
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the “Scarborough 11,” a group of eight adults and three children who 
live together in a nine-bedroom mansion, situated on just over two acres of wooded 
riverside property in an affluent part of the West End neighborhood of Hartford, 
Connecticut.1 While six of the adults are married to each other, forming three 
separate marital units, the other two are single. None of the adults in the three marital 
units has a relationship based on blood, adoption, custodianship, or guardianship to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Sara C. Bronin is Thomas F. Gallivan Chair of Real Property Law at the University 
of Connecticut and the faculty director of its Center for Energy & Environmental Law. She is 
also an architect and the Chair of the City of Hartford’s Planning & Zoning Commission. She 
would like to thank Robert Cane, Shaun McGann, Zachary Kohl, Christopher Finch, and Brian 
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 1. Susan Campbell, Despite Controversy, Intentional Living Gaining Acceptance in 
Connecticut, CONN. MAG. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.connecticutmag.com/travel/despite 
-controversy-intentional-living-gaining-acceptance-in-connecticut/article_47c651c8-cb5c 
-5f58-849c-b8dbe5944ad4.html [https://perma.cc/LNZ9-9ESD]. 
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any member of any of the other marital units. Two of the children are related to one 
marital unit, and the other child is related to another marital unit. The eight adults 
share a household budget and are purported to share an ownership interest in the 
property.2 They have intentionally chosen to live together, they consider themselves 
to be a family, and they present themselves to the outside world as a family.3  
Are they a family? Can they live where they choose? Not according to most local 
zoning codes in the United States. Zoning, which is the local regulation of land use, 
almost always defines family, limiting those who may live in a dwelling unit to those 
who satisfy the zoning code’s definition of family. Yet often times, this definition is 
drafted in a way that excludes many modern living arrangements and preferences. 
This Article explores how zoning codes can better zone for families, whatever their 
modern form may entail.  
At the time the Scarborough 11 moved into their mansion, the Hartford zoning 
code stated that only one “family,” plus up to three domestic employees of the family, 
could live in a home in that part of the West End.4 The zoning code further defined 
family to include any number of individuals related to each other by blood, marriage, 
adoption, custodianship, or guardianship, but only two adults who were not so 
related.5 The ostensible justification for this restrictive definition of family was to 
control density, while also minimizing the possibility that boardinghouses, rooming 
houses, dormitories, or fraternity or sorority houses—defined separately elsewhere 
in the zoning code—would locate in the neighborhood. Although the Scarborough 
11 did not constitute any of these undesirable uses, the terms of the zoning code made 
their residency illegal.  
Whether the Scarborough 11 intentionally violated the zoning code—an issue 
hotly debated in Hartford—is irrelevant to this discussion. Instead, I focus on how 
living arrangements such as the Scarborough 11—sometimes called “functional 
families” or “intentional communities”6—challenge conventional definitions of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. The term “ownership interest” is used loosely here. Only two of the members of the 
Scarborough 11 (one member of a marital unit and one single person) are on the deed to the 
property. The others have entered into some contractual arrangement, not available to the 
author, to share responsibility for the mortgage, upkeep, and maintenance of the property and 
to otherwise act as co-owners.  
 3. See Vanessa De La Torre, “Scarborough 11” File Federal Complaint Against 
Hartford, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 25, 2015, 10:01 PM), 
http://www.courant.com/community/hartford/hc-hartford-scarborough-zoning-0326 
-20150325-story.html [https://perma.cc/9RU9-CMQR] (quoting the lawyer for the 
Scarborough 11 as saying, “[t]his is an important right that is part of a long American tradition 
of extended families, part of a long American tradition of cooperative and collective living 
arrangements, something that goes all the way back to the Iroquois Nation, even before there 
was a United States”).  
 4. See HARTFORD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. I, § 2 (2015).  
 5. Id. 
 6. The term “functional family” is more commonly used than “intentional community,” 
for all areas of law (including zoning), so I use that term in this Article. Four hundred and 
sixty-one law reviews and articles using the term “functional family” appear in Westlaw as of 
January 28, 2019. A search of “intentional community” on Westlaw on October 4, 2018, 
however, yielded just 131 results. None of the 131 results containing the term “intentional 
community” from secondary sources discussed/analyzed local zoning ordinance definitions of 
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family in American zoning codes. These arrangements involve individuals living 
together who do not satisfy the traditional zoning code definition of family, but who 
otherwise demonstrate behaviors and characteristics of a family.  
We start with definitions, which, after all, are the primary subject of this Article. 
Part I first characterizes the most common zoning code definition of family, which 
focuses on whether people are “related” to each other. It then goes on to highlight 
some jurisdictions’ attempts to define the “unrelated” functional family.  
Part II turns to the courts, analyzing judicial treatment of functional families. It 
starts with a discussion of federal court decisions, highlighting among other cases 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, which 
upheld the application of a restrictive definition of family to exclude a group of six 
college students displaying no familial characteristics.7 It then tracks the more recent 
and growing trend in state supreme courts to reject restrictive definitions of family. 
Part II concludes by suggesting that more courts will reject definitions of family that 
exclude functional families, primarily pursuant to rational basis review required by 
challenges rooted in due process.  
Part III then gives support to the argument that zoning codes that exclude 
functional families will fail the rational basis test. It introduces sociological and 
anthropological literature, not yet cited by courts, that demonstrate that traditional 
familial arrangements are falling out of favor, and that cohabitation among unrelated 
people is on the rise. Given these clear trends over the course of several decades, 
strict adherence to traditional definitions of family seems irrational.  
Based on the law as it has developed and demographic trends, this Article 
contends that governments must allow, but may regulate, functional families. In light 
of these findings, Part IV offers suggestions to local governments. If functional 
families must be allowed, then decision-makers must decide how to balance the need 
to control density on the one hand with privacy concerns and desire to maintain 
community character on the other. No rule can achieve all three goals. Rather, a local 
government must choose which to prioritize. In doing so, they may consider three 
models: the privacy model, the density model, and the character model. A density 
model would regulate based only on the number of adults living in a particular type 
or size of dwelling. A privacy model would prioritize privacy: it would allow for a 
broad, loose definition of a household without requiring a functional family to submit 
an application to be considered as such. A character model would set forth regulatory 
requirements for the functional family focusing on the nature, length, and depth of 
their relationships. Each of the options has trade-offs.  
In the Conclusion, I will reveal how the Scarborough 11 have fared in Hartford 
—where, incidentally, I chair the planning and zoning commission, which is 
empowered with writing the zoning rules, and where my husband is mayor, 
responsible for enforcing them.  
                                                                                                                 
 
“intentional community.” Another term used by scholars is “family of choice.”  
 7. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).  
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I. DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY 
Few terms have proven more contentious than the term “family.” Pressures to 
extend the legal definition of a family to the functional equivalents of a family have 
resulted in changes in the law of immigration, health insurance, eviction, and trusts 
and estates.8 Perhaps the most significant modern discussions about what makes a 
family have been in the areas of marriage rights, custody, and divorce law—all of 
which have evolved in recent years to encompass broad definitions of family.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. There are too many citations involving these issues to fully enumerate, but I include 
a few to add flavor. There were extensive discussions in the first part of the twenty-first century 
about the extensions of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) 
(2002), to domestic partnerships. In the eviction context, the 1989 case of Braschi v. Stahl 
Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53–54 (N.Y. 1989) (protecting from eviction a gay couple who 
lived together as “permanent life partners” and extending its logic to say that “the term family 
. . . should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by 
obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection 
against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but 
instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more 
realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners 
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment 
and interdependence.”) garnered attention for being among the first judicial decisions to 
recognize a gay couple as a functional family. In the caregiving context, Carol B. Stack 
suggested that the legal system accept “folk systems” promoting kinship, rather than strict 
definitions of family. See CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN (1974). For a summary of issues of the 
family in immigration cases, see Aubry Holland, Note, The Modern Family Unit: Toward a 
More Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1049 (2008). The 
issue has come up in bystander emotional distress cases. See Thomas T. Uhl, Bystander 
Emotional Distress: Missing an Opportunity to Strengthen the Ties that Bind, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1399 (1995) (observing negative impacts of limiting to immediate family members relief 
in bystander emotional distress cases). And so on.  
 9. Numerous scholars have explored these issues. See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, 
Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1649 (2015) (noting the 
complex issues raised by the fact that “issues other than genetic connection must be relevant 
to questions of parenthood”); Naomi Cahn, The New “Art” of Family: Connecting Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies & Identity Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1461 (2018) 
(identifying legal issues related to assisted reproduction technology, including the problem of 
“genetic essentialism” which equates a child’s identity to her genes “at the expense of the 
functional family”); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay 
and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299 (1997) (observing how the Bartschi case, 
and other legal developments had begun to challenge longstanding legal principles about 
family makeup); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime 
of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L. R. 1881 (2012); Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Harriet Antczak & Mark Musico, Family Law Scholarship Goes to Court: 
Functional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 348 
(2011); Jenni Millbank, The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian Mother Litigation in the 
Era of the Eternal Biological Family, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 149 (2008); Douglas 
NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2016) 
(arguing that the landmark 2015 Supreme Court marriage equality decision Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), supports an expanded concept of parenthood “premised on 
intentional and functional, rather than biological and gendered, concepts of parentage”); 
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Martha Minow is perhaps among the most prominent scholars who have focused on 
the functional family.10 In 1991, she pushed for the law to recognize “how people 
actually live,” expressing a preference for “functional definitions of families that 
expand beyond reference to biological or formal marriage or adoptive relationship 
because the people involved have chosen family-like roles.”11 Generally, this area of 
inquiry is still evolving, making it fertile scholarly ground.  
This Article focuses on how just one area of law—local zoning—defines the 
family. Since their inception in the early twentieth century, zoning codes have 
defined who makes a family. This Part considers both the most common zoning 
definition of family (which includes only “related” people) and additional definitions 
that include unrelated people acting as the functional equivalent of a family.  
A. “Related” Families 
Zoning codes almost always define the family to include any number of people 
who are “related” to each other.12 Being related always includes relationships based 
on consanguinity and marriage. Consanguinity and marriage encompass a variety of 
relationships: parents and children; siblings; grandparents and grandchildren; a 
married couple and their in-laws, who are related to the married couple by blood, on 
both sides. In addition, zoning codes often explicitly recognize relationships based 
on adoption and sometimes recognize relationships based on custodianship 
(including foster arrangements) and guardianship.13 In some cases, guests and 
domestic workers are included.14  
                                                                                                                 
 
Raymond C. O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 363 
(2016) (noting demographic shifts and legal shifts given the decline in marital relationships); 
Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional 
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002); Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 
90 WASH. L. REV. 1245 (2015) (arguing that same-sex divorces should be equally distributed).  
 10. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 269 (1991). How this recognition happens is another question. One scholar suggests 
“registered contractual relationships” that would allow any combination of otherwise 
unrelated individuals to be recognized under the law. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 
87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 573 (2013).  
 11. Minow, supra note 10, at 271, 278. She adds that her support of expansive definitions 
of family diminishes when the law punishes people: “But I worry when the government 
assigns family-like status in order to punish people or deny them benefits for which they would 
otherwise be eligible.” Id. at 278. 
 12. SARA C. BRONIN & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 23:8 (4th ed. 2019) (“Municipalities . . . undertook to enact ordinances which 
restricted households in single-family districts to persons related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption. Today, many municipalities define ‘family’ by use of this latter ‘relatedness’ 
requirement along with a further provision allowing occupancy by a limited number of 
unrelated persons living together as a single-housekeeping unit.”). 
 13. Id. § 23:18 (“[S]ome municipalities have undertaken to enact ordinances that restrict 
households in single-family dwelling districts to persons related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption.”).  
 14. See, e.g., MANSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. IV, § B(24)(1) (2019) 
(defining family to include “[a]ny number of people related by blood, marriage, civil union, 
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A single family for the purposes of a zoning code may therefore include 
individuals related by all of the relationship types—blood, marriage, adoption, 
custodianship, guardianship, or others—allowed by the zoning code. As a result, a 
large number of people who are related to each other may nonetheless satisfy this 
definition of a family. A family may include:  
A husband (A) and wife (B), their adult children (C, D, and E), the adopted and 
natural children of C and D, the siblings of A and B, and an aging friend of E for 
whom E has assumed legal guardianship.  
A grandmother (F) and her adopted adult child (G), along with G’s wife (H) and 
children, the nieces and nephews of H, the blood-related aunt (I) and uncle (J) of G, 
along with and spouses and children of I and J.  
Twins (K and L), their spouses (M and N), the father and stepmother of K, the 
mother and stepfather of K, the widowed mother of L (O) and her twin (P), and the 
children of P.  
And so on. One might ask whether any such group of individuals would be ever 
interested in living in any of the example configurations. The point here is not that 
many people would live this way, but that they may, because the “related” definition 
of family is highly permissive with regard to the number of people who may collocate 
within a single dwelling unit.  
In this definition, groups of unrelated people are excluded. Indeed, as Justice 
Marshall noted in his dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, discussed further 
below, “related” definitions allow “an extended family of a dozen or more . . . in a 
small bungalow, [but] three elderly and retired persons could not occupy the large 
manor house next door.”15 
B. “Unrelated” Families (Functional Families) 
Zoning codes sometimes go farther than the related family to count as families 
groups who are not legally related to each other, but who demonstrate behaviors and 
characteristics of a “traditional” family. We will call these groups “functional 
families.” Often times, a zoning code will provide for a functional family through a 
provision within the definition of family that allows some (or any) number of 
unrelated people to live together “as a single housekeeping unit.”16 The concept of 
the household unit varies but generally requires sharing meals and a household 
budget. Many functional families satisfy these broad criteria. Other times, a zoning 
code will expressly define the functional family (or the intentional community) and 
establish much more specific criteria.17 In either case, there are more restrictions 
imposed on the functional family than on the “traditional” related family. Put 
differently, the law does not “care” whether A, B, C, D, and E in our example in 
Section I.A. share meals together, or whether Grandma F and her sprawling clan 
                                                                                                                 
 
adoption, foster care, guardianship or other duly authorized custodial relationship, gratuitous 
guests, domestic help and not more than one (1) additional unrelated person”). See also the 
discussion of Mansfield’s functional family definition in Section I.B.  
 15. 416 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 16. Despite exhaustive study, the Author has not encountered a zoning code that does not 
contain the household/housekeeping unit concept.  
 17. See, e.g., infra Section I.B.2 (describing ordinances).  
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share a household budget. Given the myriad of zoning jurisdictions, though, it is 
important to note that these additional restrictions on functional families fall along a 
spectrum.  
All that said, the salient distinction between jurisdictions for our purposes is not 
necessarily whether they have broad criteria like the housekeeping unit or have more 
specific and prescriptive criteria. Rather, this Article distinguishes jurisdictions 
based on the way their zoning codes achieve the three values—privacy, character, 
and density—identified as values in tension. Some zoning codes may allow the 
functional family (whether through the definition of household unit or otherwise) 
without any special approvals—the privacy model of regulation, discussed further in 
Part IV. Other zoning codes may allow the functional family but only with an 
advance approval—establishing what Part IV terms the character model of 
regulation, which requires local governments to delve into the nature of the 
relationships between unrelated persons. Part IV will add a third approach, the pure 
density model, not discussed in this Section.  
1. Privacy Model Definitions  
 In privacy model jurisdictions, members of a functional family may occupy a 
dwelling without having to undergo a formal review by zoning officials. These 
jurisdictions typically allow functional families through the broad concept of the 
housekeeping unit. Individuals operating as a household unit may locate wherever 
any other type of family may locate. In these jurisdictions, these individuals need not 
tender proof of their bonds in advance, nor must they satisfy ongoing burdens of 
proof. Inspectors will respond only to complaints about possible violations but will 
not conduct raids to determine whether the functional family meets the applicable 
criteria. The broad conduct guidelines are often unenforced, allowing functional 
families to largely escape government scrutiny. Local governments adopting the 
privacy model are, in effect, prioritizing the privacy of residents.  
The town of Wethersfield, Connecticut, exemplifies this approach. Its zoning 
code defines a family to include: 
“Any number of individuals living and cooking together as a single housekeeping 
unit, whether related to each other legally or not, and shall be deemed to include 
domestic help but not to include paying guests.”18 
Notice that this definition does not limit the number of persons who may 
constitute a housekeeping unit. However, there are limitations on the behaviors and 
characteristics of the unrelated persons claiming to constitute a family: they must live 
and cook together as a single unit. Such limitations are intended to capture the 
essential behaviors and characteristics of the so-called “traditional” family. As long 
as the unrelated persons living in a dwelling unit satisfy the housekeeping unit 
definition, they will be considered a family for the purposes of the zoning code.  
Mansfield, Connecticut, the home of the University of Connecticut, has also 
adopted a version of the privacy model. Its zoning code defines family to include 
“[p]ersons living together as a functional family.”19 The code states a presumption 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. WETHERSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. II, § 2.3 (2004). 
 19. MANSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. IV, § B(24)(4) (2019) 
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that college students, or four or more persons, living together do not constitute a 
functional family.20 The regulations go on to require that a “functional family” of 
any number of persons demonstrate the following:  
A. The occupants must share the entire dwelling unit and live and cook 
together as a single housekeeping unit. A unit in which the various 
occupants act as separate roomers may not be deemed to be occupied 
by a functional family; 
B. The group shares expenses for food, rent or ownership costs, utilities 
and other household expenses; 
C. The group is permanent and stable and not temporary or transient in 
nature. Evidence of such permanency and stability may include: 
(1) The presence of minor dependent children regularly residing in 
the household who are enrolled in local schools;  
(2)  Members of the household have the same address for purposes 
of voter's registration, driver's license, motor vehicle 
registration and filing of taxes; 
(3)  Members of the household are employed in the area; 
(4)  The household has been living together as a unit for a year or 
more whether in the current dwelling unit or other dwelling 
units; 
(5)  There is common ownership of furniture and appliances among 
the members of the household; and 
(6)  Any other factor reasonably related to whether or not the group 
is the functional equivalent of a family.21 
Mansfield’s definition of the functional family is more specific than 
Wethersfield’s. It requires that the group operate as a single housekeeping unit. But 
it also requires that the group be able to prove its stability and permanence through 
voter registrations, shared furniture ownership, and the presence of children.22 This 
proof may be required to overcome the presumptions about college students or four-
plus people living together, but it does appear to need to be tendered in advance. 
Rather, an alleged functional family may be requested to provide proof of their 
relationships to town officials only during a zoning enforcement action. Before town 
                                                                                                                 
 
(emphasis added). The code also recognizes that certain disabled groups are entitled 
to “family” status. Id. § B(24)(5).  
 20. Id. § B(24).  
 21. Id. § B(24)(4).  
 22. This definition represents what Part IV calls the character model of regulating the 
functional family.  
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officials get a complaint, the privacy of the members of the functional family is 
prioritized.  
Although Mansfield has a presumption against households with four or more 
people, it does not have an absolute cap on the number of people who can be a 
functional family.23 Unlike Mansfield and Wethersfield, many communities institute 
a cap on the number of unrelated persons constituting a household unit. In 
Connecticut,24 at least thirty municipalities (out of a total of 169) allow an unlimited 
number of unrelated individuals to cohabitate as a family.25 But most localities in the 
state set a cap on the number of unrelated individuals: fifty-nine percent have a limit 
of three, four, or five; fourteen percent have a limit of six; two percent have a limit 
of seven or eight.26 Just five communities (three percent) cap the number of unrelated 
persons at two.27 Hartford, where the Scarborough 11 live, was a member of this last 
group until January 2016, when otherwise sweeping changes to the zoning code 
modestly lifted the cap of two to three. (Since that change, the code uses the term 
“household” instead of “family” and refers to housing that other communities call 
“single-family” dwellings as “single-unit” dwellings.) While the number of unrelated 
adults who may operate in a functional family is often capped, the same is not true 
for the number of related persons who may constitute a family, beyond maximum 
occupancies required by building, housing, and health codes.  
Even if there is a cap on the number of unrelated people who can live together, 
jurisdictions that allow functional families without the need for an extra permit are 
in effect prioritizing resident privacy. Zoning officials are not delving into internal 
household matters, nor are they asking members of the functional family to prove 
their bonds, absent an enforcement action necessitating a review for compliance.  
2. Character Model Definitions  
In other jurisdictions, members of a functional family are required to tender proof 
to zoning officials about the nature, length, and depth of their relationships prior to 
being permitted in the community. This approach prioritizes analysis of the character 
of the group purporting to be a functional family. It de-emphasizes the privacy of 
members of the group.  
For an example of this approach, we turn to Ames, Iowa. The Ames zoning code 
states that “[l]arger groups of unrelated persons have frequently shown to have a 
detrimental affect [sic] on Single Family neighborhoods since larger groups of 
unrelated persons do not live as a family unit and do not have significant economic 
or emotional ties to a neighborhood.”28  
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See MANSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. IV, § B(24) (2019).  
  24. I root this discussion in the Connecticut experience because most of the state is 
regulated by zoning and because the varying codes offer a rich diversity of views. Of 
Connecticut’s 169 towns, only Eastford does not have a zoning code. 
 25. Joseph Mortelliti, Survey of Maximum Permissible Number of Unrelated Individuals 
that Qualify as a Family in Connecticut (2016) (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
Indiana Law Journal). Only 166 of the 169 towns were surveyed in this study.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. AMES, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 29.1503(4)(d) (2019). 
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Ames requires that a functional family obtain a special use permit from zoning 
officials by submitting an application containing information that demonstrates 
compliance with established standards.29 Public hearings and notice to neighbors are 
part of the special permit process. The functional family application must 
demonstrate that:  
a.  The functional family shares a strong bond or commitment to a single 
purpose (e.g. religious orders); 
b.  Members of the functional family are not legally dependent on others 
not part of the functional family; 
c.  Can establish legal domicile as defined by Iowa law; 
d.  Share a single household budget; 
e.  Prepare food and eat together regularly; 
f.  Share in the work to maintain the premises; and 
g.  Legally share in the ownership or possession of the premises.30 
As explained by its drafter, this carefully scripted definition of “functional family” 
was intended to limit the number of unrelated college students cohabitating.31 It 
achieves this goal by laying out behaviors and characteristics that the typical group 
of college students would not normally exhibit.32 Rather, a functional family 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Id. Note: Ames considers residents in a “family home” a “family” as opposed to a 
“functional family.” AMES, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 29.201(72) (2018). 
 30. AMES, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 29.1503(4)(d) (2019). 
 31. Dwight H. Merriam, Ozzie and Harriet Don't Live Here Anymore: Time to Redefine 
Family, ZONING PRACTICE, Feb. 2007, at 2, 5–7.  
 32. The Ames code also provides a definition for “family.” AMES, IOWA, MUNICIPAL 
CODE § 29.201(72) (2018) (“Family means a person living alone, or any of the following 
groups living together as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit and sharing common living, 
sleeping, cooking, and eating facilities: (a) Any number of people related by blood, marriage, 
adoption, guardianship or other duly-authorized custodial relationship; (b) Three unrelated 
people; (c) Two unrelated people and any children related to either of them; (d) Not more than 
eight people who are: (i) Residents of a ‘Family Home’ as defined in Section 414.22 of the 
Iowa code and this ordinance; or (ii) ‘Handicapped’ as defined in the Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 3602 (h) and this ordinance. This definition does not include those persons 
currently illegally using or addicted to a ‘controlled substance’ as defined in the Controlled 
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 802 (6); (e) Not more than five people who are granted a 
Special Use Permit as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit (a ‘functional family’) pursuant to 
Section 29.1503(4)(d) of this ordinance.”). Ames excludes from the definition of family: “a. 
Any society, club, fraternity, sorority, association, lodge, combine, federation, coterie, or like 
organization; b. Any group of individuals whose association is temporary or seasonal in 
nature; and c. Any group of individuals who are in a group living arrangement as a result of 
criminal offenses.” (emphasis omitted); see also id. § 29.201(194) (“Single, Nonprofit 
Housekeeping Unit means the functional equivalent of a traditional family, including a non-
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sanctioned by the zoning code to live in Ames must act like a traditional family, or 
at least an idealized version of one.  
Minneapolis has also adopted the character model. It includes in the definition of 
family the “intentional community” (another term for a functional family).33 The city 
places no cap on the number of people who can live in an intentional community but 
requires that members of the community “liv[e] together as a single household, [and] 
shar[e] in the management of resources and household expenses.”34 Intentional 
communities must be registered and must submit an application that provides the 
name of the community, the community’s official representative, and floor plans, 
among other things.35 City officials must be notified if a community dissolves, if 
members of the community change, or if the named representative of the community 
ceases to reside in the community.36 Intentional communities may only be located in 
certain places.37 Interestingly, Minneapolis also allows for up to five unrelated 
people to live together “as a single housekeeping unit” without having to apply for 
any special permits.38 Perhaps more interestingly, the city is moving in the direction 
of more liberal zoning laws, as its comprehensive plan adopted in late 2018 virtually 
guarantees that “single-family” zoning will be phased out within a decade.39  
Through prescriptive rules, treatments of the functional family are designed to 
proactively and intentionally limit groups considered undesirable in and 
“detrimental”40 to strictly residential areas. They bar college friends, fraternity 
brothers, and sorority sisters because they require sharing household expenses and a 
single household budget. They bar itinerant travelers, such as roomers and boarders, 
because they require occupants to show a permanent relationship to the other 
                                                                                                                 
 
transient, interactive group of persons jointly occupying or a non-transient individual person 
occupying a single dwelling unit, including the joint or individual use of common areas, for 
the purpose of sharing or conducting household activities and responsibilities such as meals, 
chores and expenses. ‘Single, Nonprofit Housekeeping Unit’ shall not include occupants of a 
boarding house, hotel, fraternity, sorority, or club.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 33. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 12, art. VIII, § 244.820(c) (2019) 
(“[A] family may include a group of two (2) or more unrelated adults living together in a 
dwelling unit when operating as an intentional community.”).  
 34. Id. tit. 20, § 520.160 (“An intentional community shall share an entire dwelling unit 
and may not function as a rooming house.”).  
 35. Id. tit. 12, art. VIII, § 244.820(e).  
 36. Id. § 244.820(d).  
 37. Id. § 244.820(d)(3) (barring intentional communities in rental properties owned by 
landlords with “Tier II or Tier III” properties).  
 38. Id. § 244.40.  
 39. See Minneapolis City Council Agenda: Regular Meeting, MINNEAPOLIS (Dec. 7, 
2018), https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/MarkedAgenda/Council/694 [https://perma.cc/C2H9-
6X6K] (adopting the Minneapolis 2040 Comprehensive Plan). The comprehensive plan goals 
may actually be enacted within the year pursuant to state law requirements that the city actively 
update its zoning code to conform with its comprehensive plan. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
473.858 (West 2008 & Supp. 2019). I am using the term “single-family” here because that is 
the term most dominant in zoning codes and in the literature. In the Hartford zoning code, we 
have replaced the term “single-family” with the term “single-unit.”  
 40. See, e.g., AMES, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 29.1503(4)(d)(i) (2019) (calling large 
groups of unrelated persons “detrimental” to single-family neighborhoods).  
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occupants of the housing unit. They bar recovering alcoholics and others receiving 
rehabilitation or medical treatment, except to the extent such persons are protected 
by federal law, for the same reason.41 As noted above, these uses are typically 
separately defined and regulated.  
* * * 
It may be important to reemphasize here that what constitutes a functional family 
is a tricky question. Consider, for example, nuns, college friends, sorority sisters, 
itinerant travelers, recovering alcoholics, and similar groups wanting to cohabitate. 
Zoning codes typically treat convents, dormitories, fraternity and sorority houses, 
rooming houses, group homes, and rehabilitation homes not as dwelling units (which 
may be occupied by a family) but as other types of as residential living types, 
distinctly regulated.42 Some of these arrangements may be more desirable than 
others. For example, a group of quiet, elderly nuns may be thought to have fewer 
negative land use effects than a group of sorority sisters who may be more likely to 
throw raucous parties. Other uses, including group homes, may not be favored 
locally, but for policy reasons, may be difficult to restrict.43  
The distinction between groups of friends and functional families presents special 
problems. About a decade ago, there was a push among some scholars to prioritize 
friendship within our legal system.44 Among this group of scholars, which include 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. See, e.g., MANSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. IV, § B(24)(4) (2019) 
(specifying circumstances that might allow recovering alcoholics or others receiving 
rehabilitation or medical treatment to be considered a family pursuant to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act). Note, however, that state legislatures often limit 
local governments’ ability to exclude rehabilitation homes. For example, Iowa requires local 
governments to consider homes for persons with disabilities as “family homes,” IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 414.30 (West 2015), a term that allows up to eight people to receive care in one 
location. Id. § 414.22 (2)(c). 
 42. BRONIN, supra note 12, at § 23:21 (“The ‘functional family’ test, however, is unlikely 
to be met in cases involving boarding or rooming houses, large groups of students, such as 
fraternities or sororities or residential treatment centers or similar institutional uses.”) 
(citations omitted).  
 43. It is important to note that the functional family is different from residents of a group 
home (also called a “family home” or a “residential care facility”). Generally, a group home 
is a noninstitutional residential facility for individuals with developmental disabilities. Group 
homes are protected under the law. Thirty-seven states preempt local regulation of group 
homes, and thirty-five of these require that group homes be subject to the same zoning 
restrictions as single-family dwelling units. See id. at § 23:24–29; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-3e (West 2010) (“No zoning regulation shall treat the following in a manner 
different from any single family residence: (1) Any community residence that houses six or 
fewer persons with intellectual disability and necessary staff persons . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 393.062 (West 2018) (“[Group homes] shall be considered and treated as a functional 
equivalent of a family unit and not as an institution, business, or boarding home”). States vary 
as to how many individuals may reside in a group home in residential districts—though 
twenty-four states allow up to six or eight developmentally disabled individuals plus 
staff/guardians.  
 44. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2705 
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Katherine Franke and Ethan Lieb, there is a feeling that friendship has gotten short 
shrift because friendship is just as important as other privileged relationships, such 
as marital or professional relationships, yet is not protected in the same way. They 
are right that the law regulates friendship without expressly acknowledging it is 
doing so.45 Indeed, the definitions noted in Part I would exclude mere friends—
regulating them, in effect, out of the areas where families (including functional 
families) are privileged. Perhaps only in privacy model jurisdictions could friendship 
relationships find a home—not because friends satisfy local zoning definitions of 
family or functional family, but because looser rules may lead to looser enforcement. 
This Article does not go so far as to say that friendships must be as privileged as 
functional families, though I leave the question open for another scholar.  
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL FAMILY  
Local zoning code definitions of family and functional family provide important 
background as we turn to courts. Relevant cases arise when a local government 
enforces its zoning code against a group of people who do not satisfy the definition 
of family (or, where it exists, the definition of functional family). The group may 
challenge the zoning code as applied or as written, on statutory or constitutional 
grounds. Federal and state courts have dealt differently with these challenges. After 
reviewing these cases, this Part concludes by articulating the judicial trend of striking 
down laws that exclude a true functional family but upholding laws challenged by 
groups of mere friends.  
A. The Federal Cases 
Over the course of just three years, the Supreme Court decided two key cases 
relating to how local governments may regulate a family through zoning. In the first 
case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,46 regulation of unrelated persons was upheld 
when applied to a group of six college students not functioning as a family. In the 
second case, Moore v. City of East Cleveland,47 a prohibition on related members of 
an extended family was struck down when applied to a grandmother and her 
grandsons. Although the Supreme Court has never considered how a zoning code 
applies to a functional family, these two decisions, and a third involving a federal 
law offering food-related aid to low-income persons,48 provide important insights 
about the extent to which the Court may sanction a zoning code’s infringement upon 
the right to privacy and, further, the related right to assemble a household.  
                                                                                                                 
 
(2008); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 654 (2007); Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007). 
 45. E.g., Leib, supra note 44, at 631 (“I offer a normative argument for why the law should 
promote a public policy of friendship facilitation and for why the law ignores friendships only 
at its peril. . . . We are regulating friendships without even recognizing that we are doing so . 
. . I offer a framework to show how the law could exact certain duties from friends and confer 
certain privileges upon them as well.”).  
 46. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 47. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 48. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
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1. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas  
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Supreme Court considered a challenge by 
a landlord and six unrelated college students to a zoning regulation that limited a 
“family” to:  
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and 
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household 
servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and 
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by 
blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.49 
No application or advance permit was required for occupancy, which means under 
our framework, Belle Terre was a privacy model jurisdiction. The landlord had been 
cited for violating the ordinance, likely after a complaint. Among other things, the 
landlord’s challenge alleged that this language interfered with the right to travel and 
the right to privacy.50 The Supreme Court rejected these claims, reasoning that 
“every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been 
included.”51 According to the Court, the line drawn by the zoning ordinance of Belle 
Terre fell well within the city’s police power because the police power allows for 
localities to deal with “urban problems” like boarding houses and fraternity houses 
and to otherwise address the question of density.52 More broadly, the Court noted, 
the police power allows localities to “lay out zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary 
for people.”53 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, agreed that the police power allowed local 
governments broad powers but found that the classification between related and 
unrelated individuals “burdens the students’ fundamental rights of association and 
privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”54 Conflating the right 
of privacy with the right to “establish a home,” he reasoned that:  
The choice of household companions—of whether a person's 
“intellectual and emotional needs” are best met by living with family, 
friends, professional associates, or others—involves deeply personal 
considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within 
the home. That decision surely falls within the ambit of the right to 
privacy protected by the Constitution.55  
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. 416 U.S. at 2 (alteration in original).  
 50. Id. at 7.  
 51. Id. at 8. The Court rejected the right to travel argument, because the ordinance “is not 
aimed at transients,” and also found that no right of privacy was implicated. Id. at 7 (citing 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).  
 52. Id. at 9.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 55. Id. at 15–16 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969); Griswold v. 
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Because the zoning ordinance impinged on the fundamental right of privacy, 
Justice Marshall went on to say, strict scrutiny required that the burden imposed on 
the students be necessary, and narrowly drawn, to protect a compelling and 
substantial governmental interest.56 He found that the Belle Terre ordinance did not 
survive constitutional scrutiny because it was not narrowly drawn to achieve the 
purpose of controlling population density, noise, traffic, and parking problems.57 
Among other things, he noted that “[w]hile an extended family of a dozen or more 
might live in a small bungalow, three elderly and retired persons could not occupy 
the large manor house next door.”58 Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by 
suggesting that the town restrict population density by limiting each household to a 
specific number of adults, whether related or unrelated, place controls on rent, or 
limit the number of vehicles per household.59  
2. Moore v. City of East Cleveland 
With Justice Marshall’s suggestions in mind, we pivot now to a case decided by 
a plurality of the Court three years after Belle Terre: Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland.60 At issue was a challenge to a zoning ordinance’s highly restrictive 
definition of family, which prohibited a grandmother from living with her son and 
two grandsons (who were cousins).61 The Moore Court struck down the ordinance 
because it infringed on the right to privacy and failed to promote the “family values” 
deemed so important in Belle Terre.62 Observing that the regulation of allowable and 
prohibited categories of relatives “slic[ed] deeply into the family itself,”63 the Court 
took judicial note of the fact that “millions of our citizens” grow up in households 
                                                                                                                 
 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Moreno v. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 315 (D.C. 1972), aff'd, 
413 U. S. 528 (1973)).  
 56. Id. at 12–14, 18. 
 57. Id. at 18–20.  
 58. Id. at 19.  
 59. Id. at 19–20.  
 60. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  
 61. Id. at 496 n.2 (citing the city’s ordinance as stating: “‘Family’ means a number of 
individuals related to the nominal head of the household or to the spouse of the nominal head 
of the household living as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to 
the following: (a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household. (b) Unmarried 
children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the 
household, provided, however, that such unmarried children have no children residing with 
them. (c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal 
head of the household. (d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family 
may include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of 
the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and 
dependent children of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent 
person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished for him by the 
nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household. (e) A 
family may consist of one individual.”).  
 62. Id. at 498. 
 63. Id. at 498–99. 
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containing extended family members, stating that “the accumulated wisdom of 
civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, . . . 
supports a larger conception of the family.”64 A concurring opinion written by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall underscored this point; it noted that while the nuclear 
family was dominant in “white suburbia,” there was a striking “prominence of other 
than nuclear families among ethnic and racial minority groups, including our black 
citizens.”65 In their view, the Court’s decision properly recognized the need for 
sensitivity in respecting diverse preferences.  
Citing many of the cases Marshall cited in Belle Terre, the Court affirmed a due 
process right of intimate association in family living arrangements and the 
consequent need of courts to consider how well a privacy-constraining regulation 
achieves the purported governmental interest.66 The Court discredited the purported 
governmental interests of the East Cleveland regulation—“preventing overcrowding, 
minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden 
on [the] school system”—by presenting scenarios in which the definition of family 
would allow higher numbers of adults and children than allowed in the case of the 
grandmother and her relatives at issue.67 In this key argument, the Moore plurality 
parroted Justice Marshall’s Belle Terre dissent, which argued that the Belle Terre 
ordinance was not narrowly drawn to control density, one of the claimed 
governmental interests justifying that regulation, because it allowed an unlimited 
number of related persons to live together.68  
The most interesting opinion in Moore for our purposes may be the concurrence 
of Justice Stevens, new to the Court since the Belle Terre decision. In his view, 
zoning could not regulate the identities of those comprising a household, whether 
related or unrelated, unless the regulation was aimed at reducing the transiency of a 
community.69 Because the Belle Terre ordinance was “primarily concerned with the 
prevention of transiency in a small, quiet suburban community,” he explained, it was 
justifiably upheld.70 Because the East Cleveland ordinance infringed on the makeup 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Id. at 504–05. The Court concluded the opinion by saying that “the Constitution 
prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to live 
in certain narrowly defined family patterns.” Id. at 506.  
 65. Id. at 508–10 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan had also issued a dissent in 
Belle Terre. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 521 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 66. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498–99 (recognizing that living as an extended family falls within 
the “freedom of personal choice . . . [that] is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 639–640 (1974)). 
 67. Id. at 499–500. 
 68. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 69. Note that Justice Stevens’s use of the “transiency” concept differed from Justice 
Douglas’s use of that word in the Belle Terre majority opinion. In Belle Terre, Justice Douglas 
said, “It [the ordinance] is not aimed at transients,” presumably in response to, and as a means 
of rejecting, the challenge based on the right to travel. Id. at 7 (majority opinion). By 
implication, the right to live in a particular place does not bear legal relation to the right to 
travel. In Moore, Justice Stevens sanctions restrictions on transient living arrangements, but 
does not opine on individuals’ right to move from one place to another, which is the more 
common explanation of the right to travel. Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 70. Moore, 431 U.S. at 494, 519 n.15. 
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of the household without addressing the transiency issue, it was justifiably struck 
down. Justice Stevens’ opinion went beyond this attempt to harmonize Supreme 
Court cases, taking a perhaps surprising detour into “well-reasoned” state judicial 
decisions that struck down ordinances “prohibiting, either expressly or implicitly” 
unrelated persons from cohabitating.71 Justice Stevens used these cases to underscore 
the far-reaching intrusion of the East Cleveland ordinance and to demonstrate 
judicial support for his notion that regulation should only survive judicial scrutiny if 
it aimed to prevent transiency.72 If state courts were striking down laws limiting 
unrelated persons, there seemed to be little justification for the Supreme Court to 
uphold one preventing blood relatives from cohabitating.  
3.  U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno  
A third Supreme Court case, unrelated to zoning and decided just before Belle 
Terre and Moore, may add a dimension to this discussion: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno. The case dealt with recent amendments to the federal food 
stamp law, which declared ineligible for benefits certain people who lived with 
unrelated individuals.73 In that case, the Court held that the statutory amendment 
redefining “household” to include only groups of related individuals denied equal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. at 516–19 nn.7–14 (citing, among other cases, Women's Kansas City St. Andrew 
Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593, 594, 606 (8th Cir. 1932) (finding application of a zoning 
ordinance to block occupancy of a single-family home by “elderly white ladies” “is not an 
essential of the general zoning plan, and is in its application to plaintiff's property so arbitrary 
and unreasonable as to be void”); Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 81 (1962) 
(allowing two unrelated students to constitute a single housekeeping unit); Neptune Park Ass’n 
v. Steinberg, 84 A.2d 687, 689 (Conn. 1951) (allowing four related families to rent a summer 
home because they shared lodging, cooking, and eating facilities); City of Des Plaines v. 
Trottner, 216 N.E.2d 116 (Ill. 1966) (rejecting a definition of family that allowed only related 
persons in a challenge by four unrelated young men); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of 
Manasquan, 281 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1971) (rejecting a definition of family that allowed only 
related persons as “sweepingly excessive”); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756 
(N.Y. 1974) (rejecting a definition of family that allowed only related persons in a challenge 
by a group home); Missionaries of Our Lady of LaSalette v. Vill. of Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 
627 (Wis. 1954) (finding that six priests and two lay brothers constituted a family for zoning 
purposes); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. App. 1967) (allowing a 
group of religious novices to occupy a home in a single-family neighborhood because: “Under 
the terms of the ordinance any number of persons occupying the premises and living as a single 
housekeeping unit are entitled to the status of a family. There is no requirement that they be 
related by consanguinity or affinity.”); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 
396 (Ky. App. 1954) (holding that about twenty nurses living together with limited kitchen 
facilities and centralized housekeeping were a “family” as defined by the zoning ordinance, 
and stating that “[t]he word ‘family’ is an elastic term and is applied in many ways.”).  
 72. Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 73. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530 (1973) (“As initially enacted, [the 
law] defined a ‘household’ as ‘a group of related or non-related individuals, who are not 
residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing 
common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common.’ In 
January 1971, however, Congress redefined the term ‘household’ so as to include only groups 
of related individuals.”). 
18 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:1 
 
protection to unrelated individuals based on private matters of free association within 
the home.74 The definition in question had originally been codified as “a group of 
related or non-related individuals, who are not residents of an institution or boarding 
house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and 
for whom food is customarily purchased in common.”75 In 1971, however, Congress 
redefined the term “household” to mean:  
a group of related individuals (including legally adopted children and 
legally assigned foster children) or non-related individuals over age 60 
who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living 
as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom 
food is customarily purchased in common.76  
The government attorneys in that case did not deny that the congressional record 
contained information suggesting that the amendment was intended to prevent 
“hippie communes” from participating in the food stamp program.77 The Court found 
that there was no rational reason to discriminate against “hippie communes,” and that 
the amendment was motivated by animus and did not have any other legitimate 
purpose, such as combating fraud.78 Rather, the Court found, “mothers who try to 
raise their standard of living by sharing housing will be affected” and the amendment 
excludes “only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot 
even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.”79  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Belle Terre and Moore acknowledged Moreno, 
but only in passing. The Moore plurality cited to Moreno in a footnote focused on 
whether the East Cleveland ordinance was advancing legitimate purposes.80 In 
another footnote, the Belle Terre Court rejected the applicability of Moreno, saying 
that the Belle Terre ordinance did not appear to be motivated by animus toward 
unfavored groups.81 We will revisit the rational basis test used in Moreno in future 
discussion.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. Id. at 534.  
 75. Id. at 530. 
 76. Id. at 530 n.2 (also including “(1) a single individual living alone who has cooking 
facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (2) an elderly person 
who meets the requirements of section 2019(h) of this title”).  
 77. Id. at 534–35.  
 78. Id. at 535–38. 
 79. Id. at 537–38. 
 80. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 n.7 (1977).  
 81. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 n.6 (1974). But see id. at 18 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (using Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Moreno to argue that freedom of 
association allows anyone to invite others to join a household). Other decisions have also 
rejected Moreno as applicable. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 637–39 (1986) 
(applying rational basis scrutiny to the distinction between parents, children, siblings, and all 
other groups of individuals and finding that the Food Stamp Act statutory definition of 
“household” had a rational basis). The Court opined: “Congress could reasonably determine 
that close relatives sharing a home—almost by definition—tend to purchase and prepare meals 
together while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be so inclined. In that 
event, even though close relatives are undoubtedly as honest as other food stamp recipients, 
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B. In State Courts 
As Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Moore pointed out, a number of state courts 
had recognized, even before Belle Terre and Moore, that local governments could 
not limit the number of unrelated persons occupying single-family residences, unless 
such limitation prohibited transient occupancy. Since those decisions, state courts 
have continued to grapple with the extent to which local governments should be 
allowed to regulate household composition through zoning. Some state courts have 
rejected strict definitions of family, while others have upheld them.  
Often, these decisions are decided on state constitutional grounds. While each 
state’s body of constitutional law has its own idiosyncrasies, the differences are not 
great. The constitutional language at issue in each case is nearly identical to that of 
the Federal Constitution. States whose courts distinguish themselves from the 
Supreme Court in Belle Terre do so because they find that the distinctions made 
between families as traditionally defined and functional families are not rationally 
related to the interests advanced. States that reject challenges to zoning codes, as 
Belle Terre did, usually do not have a functional family at bar, and the localities 
before them rationally justify the restrictive definitions.  
As the analysis below will describe in greater detail, so far five states recognize a 
constitutional right to living as a functional family. Each of these five states 
considered what we have been calling a “privacy model regulation”—not requiring 
an advance permit but applied primarily upon request (either a declaratory request 
by the property owner or a request for enforcement by a disgruntled neighbor).  
1. Cases Rejecting Strict Definitions of Family  
Since Belle Terre, four state high courts—California, Michigan, New York, and 
New Jersey—have stuck down zoning ordinances that limited the number of 
unrelated individuals who may live together and failed to provide for functional 
families.82 One lower court in Rhode Island also struck down such limits.83  
The factual settings of these cases have several things in common that are 
important when comparing them to cases upholding restrictive definitions of family. 
In all but one of the cases, the residents were party to the case.84 Additionally, three 
                                                                                                                 
 
the potential for mistaken or misstated claims of separate dining would be greater in the case 
of close relatives than would be true for those with weaker communal ties, simply because a 
greater percentage of the former category in fact prepare meals jointly than the comparable 
percentage in the latter category.” Id. at 642.  
 82. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1989); Charter Twp. of 
Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1984); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 486 (N.J. 1979); 
McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (N.Y. 1985).  
 83. Distefano v. Haxton, No. C.A. NO. WC 92-0589, 1994 WL 931006 (Super. Ct. R.I. 
Dec. 12, 1994). 
 84. McMinn involved only the landlord. McMinn, 488 N.E.2d at 1240; see also Adamson, 
610 P.2d at 436; Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 831; Baker, 405 A.2d at 368; Distefano, 1994 WL 
931006, at *1 (contrasting with the cases upholding limits that typically included only the 
landlord or a landlord association).  
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of the five cases involved groups that would be considered functional families.85 The 
plaintiff families in Township of Delta v. Dinolfo each consisted of a household of 
six unrelated, single individuals and a married couple with children intending to 
reside together permanently while functioning as a single household unit.86 In City 
of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, the family was composed of twelve adults in their 
twenties and thirties who lived together for social, economic, and psychological 
support.87 The family “include[d] a business woman, a graduate biochemistry 
student, a tractor-business operator, a real estate woman, a lawyer, and others.”88 
Finally, the family in State v. Baker included the homeowner, his wife, and three 
daughters, as well as an unrelated woman and her three children living together as 
one family and contributing to the whole.89 Baker and Dinolfo also involved people 
who came together based, in part, on religious belief.90  
The parties in all of these cases challenged the zoning ordinances on a range of 
state constitutional grounds. The courts hearing the challenges primarily made 
decisions on due process grounds, though two also considered the right to privacy. 
One of those two cases was determined only on the right to privacy issue: in City of 
Santa Barbara v. Adamson, the California Supreme Court struck down an ordinance 
limiting the number of unrelated individuals living in a housekeeping unit to five on 
the ground that it violated the right to privacy contained in the California 
Constitution.91 In that case, the occupants claimed to have been “a close group with 
social, economic, and psychological commitments to each other . . . [who] share 
expenses, rotate chores, and eat evening meals together.”92 The court stated that the 
state constitutional right to privacy protects intrusions to individual privacy, unless 
they are justified by a compelling public interest. In reviewing the city’s interests in 
enacting the zoning code, the court reviewed whether the “rule-of-five truly and 
substantially help[s] effect” goals of maintaining the character of the district and 
prohibiting commercial activities, among other goals.93 Relying on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1973 decision in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the California 
court noted that the enforcement of a morality standard would not be a legitimate 
goal.94 It also observed that there were other, less restrictive means of achieving the 
stated goals, such as floor space, noise, traffic, and parking limitations. Adamson is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See Adamson, 610 P.2d at 438; Baker, 405 A.2d. at 370; Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 834. 
The New York case involved four unrelated men in their early 20s who were childhood friends, 
McMinn, 488 N.E.2d at 1240, and the Rhode Island trial court case involved indeterminate 
unrelated individuals exceeding the ordinance. Distefano, 1994 WL 931006, at *2. 
 86. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 834. 
 87. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 438. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Baker, 405 A.2d at 370. 
 90. See id. at 370; Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 834. 
 91. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.”); Adamson, 610 P.2d at 439–41. 
 92. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 438. 
 93. Id. at 441. 
 94. See supra Section II.A.3. 
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the only state supreme court case to apply strict scrutiny to the challenged ordinance 
because a fundamental right was contained in the state constitution.95  
Each of the other courts based their decisions on interpretations of the due process 
clauses of state constitutions that did not vary greatly from the Due Process Clauses 
in the United States Constitution. In each case, the state court distinguished its 
holding from that in Belle Terre and analyzed the rational relationship between the 
ordinance and the municipalities’ stated goals. The courts held, in each case, that the 
limits on unrelated household members failed to rationally address the harms 
advanced.  
While holding that the goals of “preserv[ing] . . . traditional family values, 
maint[aining] . . . property values and population and density control” were 
legitimate governmental interests, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Township of 
Delta v. Dinolfo that the court could not assume, as the town argued, that different 
and undesirable behavior was to be expected of functional families.96 Therefore, the 
court held that the legitimate governmental interests described were not related to the 
limits on unrelated family members in the ordinance, and the ordinance was 
capricious and arbitrary under the due process clause of the state constitution.97 The 
court also clarified the role of the government’s police power with respect to 
constitutional rights:  
 We agree that it would be easier for the plaintiff, with one broad stroke 
of its legislative brush, to sweep out of its residential neighborhoods a 
whole class of persons desiring residential accommodations than to have 
to legislate and enforce against the specific behavior it finds offensive 
and finds associated with the unrelated class. But protecting the 
constitutional rights of citizens comes before making life easy for 
government.98 
The court expressed confidence that its ruling would not restrict the 
municipality’s police power so as to render it ineffective in preserving the desirable 
qualities of a single-family residential district. The township “need not open its 
residential borders to transients and others whose lifestyle is not the functional 
equivalent of ‘family’ life.”99 Going further, the court noted that nothing precluded 
the government “from distinguishing between the biological family and a functional 
family when it is rational to do so, such as in limiting the number of persons who 
may occupy a dwelling for such valid reasons as health, fire safety, or density 
control.”100 The court went on to state, “one factor which distinguishes families from 
groups of unrelated persons” is that “[i]f an unrelated household group exceeds the 
designated density requirement it is by voluntary action of the group. The blood 
related family by its natural growth may become in excess of the density limit.”101  
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 440–41. 
 96. 351 N.W.2d 831, 840–43 (Mich. 1984). 
 97. Id. at 844. 
 98. Id. at 842. 
 99. Id. at 843. 
 100. Id. at 843–44. 
 101. Id. (quoting Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706, 709 (N.H. 1975)). 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly recognized that zoning regulations 
prohibiting more than four unrelated people from living together violated the 
constitutional rights to privacy and due process. The court in State v. Baker reasoned 
that “[r]egulations based upon biological traits or legal relationships necessarily 
reflect generalized assumptions about the stability and social desirability of 
households comprised of unrelated individuals—assumptions which in many cases 
do not reflect the real world[,]”102 and that functional families may fit in, and even 
fit in better than biological or legal families. In the facts presented, the group of 
individuals “was of sufficient permanence so as to resemble a more traditional 
extended family.”103 The court observed: 
 The fatal flaw in attempting to maintain a stable residential neighborhood 
through the use of criteria based upon biological or legal relationships is 
that such classifications operate to prohibit a plethora of uses which pose 
no threat to the accomplishment of the end sought to be achieved. 
Moreover, such a classification system legitimizes many uses which 
defeat that goal.104  
Further, the court acknowledged that the legitimization of unlimited related 
persons conflicts with the goals of controlling density, traffic, and character of the 
neighborhood: “Municipal officials remain free to define in a reasonable manner 
what constitutes such a unit. Moreover, space-related occupancy limitations . . . may 
be used to preclude the possibility of household groups of ‘unrestricted’ size. Thus, 
only groups compatible with a residential area will benefit by today’s opinion.”105 
Indeed, the Baker court confirmed the goals of preserving a family style of living and 
controlling overcrowding and congestion could more sensibly be achieved through 
size and area restrictions.106  
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. 405 A.2d 368, 372 (N.J. 1979). Note that two years prior, a lower New Jersey state 
court had held that an ordinance was unconstitutionally restrictive, legally unreasonable, and 
void to the extent that it limited occupancy on the basis of biological relationship or to single, 
nonprofit household units. See Holy Name Hosp. v. Montroy, 189, 379 A.2d 299, 303 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (citations omitted) (“[I]t is beyond the outer perimeter of 
permissible municipal control to consider mere habitation by a group of nuns as a zoning 
violation. If the regulation were to restrict occupancy of single-family dwellings to persons 
constituting a bona fide housekeeping unit, it would withstand judicial scrutiny and still carry 
out the legislative purpose. Any numerical limitation would have to be of general application 
and reasonably related to habitable floor area or sleeping and bathroom facilities.”).  
 103. Baker, 405 A.2d at 375. 
 104. Id. at 371. 
 105. Id. at 372 n.3 (emphasis added). But see Justice Mountain’s dissent, mourning the loss 
of a homeowner’s “relief” should a group of unrelated persons move in next door: 
As of this writing . . . there is no homeowner in New Jersey who can say with 
any assurance that his next door neighbor's house, or that of his friend down the 
street, may not at any time and without warning, either be occupied by two or 
more families or by a group of unrelated persons indefinite in number. 
Id. at 376 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 106. Id. at 372–73 (majority opinion). Such accepted restrictions included restrictions on 
incompatible uses, limits on floor area per occupant, sleeping and bathrooms facilities per 
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Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York held in McMinn v. Town of Oyster 
Bay that the due process clause of the state constitution was violated by a zoning 
ordinance that was defined to include only two unrelated people who were sixty-two 
years of age or older. Using the rational basis test, the court reasoned that there was 
“no reasonable relationship to the goals of reducing parking and traffic problems, 
controlling population density and preventing noise and disturbance,” and restricting 
occupancy to biological and legal relationships.107 Since the achievement of such 
goals depended “generally upon the size of the dwelling and the lot and the number 
of its occupants,” restrictions on household composition were under- and over-
inclusive.108 Moreover, the court held that the legitimate governmental objective of 
preserving family character of a neighborhood was not achieved by limiting the 
definition of a family to exclude a “household which in every but a biological sense 
is a single family.”109 It went on to say:  
Zoning is “intended to control types of housing and living and not the 
genetic or intimate internal family relations of human beings” and if a 
household is “the functional and factual equivalent of a natural family” 
the ordinance may not exclude it from a single-family neighborhood and 
still serve a valid purpose.110  
Therefore, the court held, the ordinance was facially unconstitutional.111 Since 
McMinn was decided, New York courts have held the line at the functional family, 
including a 2018 decision that declined to expand the definition of family to include 
a group of college students.112 
Note that in each case, except Adamson, the state’s high court held that the 
challenged ordinance violated the state’s constitution under the rational basis test. 
Each of these courts determined that the family definitions were not reasonably 
related to the interests advanced. In discussing the New York and New Jersey cases, 
a commentator observed that “these cases demonstrate a judicially imposed 
limitation on the zoning power: municipalities cannot create classifications 
distinguishing traditional families from domestic groups that, from a land use point 
of view, are their functional equivalents.”113  
                                                                                                                 
 
occupant, limits on the number of cars, and other use and area restrictions which were more 
closely tied to the goals advanced. Id. 
 107. McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1243 (N.Y. 1985).  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citations omitted).  
 111. Id. at 1244. 
 112. See, e.g., Grodinsky v. City of Cortland, 82 N.Y.S.3d 192, 193–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2018) (upholding as legitimate a zoning ordinance that allowed both a “family” and a 
“functional equivalent of a traditional family” and rejecting the arguments of landlords who 
rented properties primarily to college students).  
 113. J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 790–94 
(1982).  
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2. Cases Upholding Strict Definitions of Family 
For every case striking down limits on unrelated household members, there are 
several upholding such limits under Belle Terre or interrelated or independent state 
law. These cases are often factually analogous to each other. First, most cases are 
brought by, or defend an enforcement action against, a landlord alone.114 Second, 
many cases upholding unrelated household limits involve college students as 
residents.115 Others involve other tenants as residents.116  
The courts upholding restrictive definitions of family lean into precedential 
language that emphasized the high burdens on challengers and the deference given 
to validity. These courts all emphasize the deferential nature of the rational basis test 
employed in such zoning cases.117 Additionally, the zoning ordinances are presumed 
constitutional, and the burden is on the challenger to prove unconstitutionality, even 
to the extent of eliminating every possible reasonable basis for the enactment.118 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See Dinan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Stratford, 595 A.2d 864 (Conn. 1991); Ames 
Rental Prop. Ass'n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 2007) (involving a landlord 
association as party); City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge v. Myers, 145 So. 3d 320 
(La. 2014); State v. Champoux, 566 N.W.2d 763 (Neb. 1997); Town of Durham v. White 
Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706 (N.H. 1975); City of Brookings v. Winker, 554 N.W.2d 827 (S.D. 
1996). A few cases have upheld unrelated household member limits with household members 
as parties. See Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. 2003) (including the four 
unrelated college students as parties); City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986) (involving the cohabitating couple alone as the parties); McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of 
Zoning Appeals, 719 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) (including one of the unrelated 
tenants as a party). 
 115. See Dvorak, 796 N.E.2d at 236; Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 255; Durham, 348 A.2d 
at 706; McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 660; Winker, 554 N.W.2d at 827. 
 116. See Dinan, 595 A.2d at 864; Myers, 145 So. 3d at 320; Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 745; 
Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 763.  
 117. See Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 259, 261 (“Under this deferential standard, the 
zoning ordinance is valid unless the relationship between the classification and the purpose 
behind it is so weak the classification must be viewed as arbitrary or capricious. . . . [Deference 
is given to council members to]  legislate based on their observations of real life.”); Horn, 720 
S.W.2d at 752 (“In making such a determination [of whether there is a reasonable basis for the 
ordinance], if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed is 
presented in support of the ordinance, we must defer to the legislative judgment.”); McMaster, 
719 S.E.2d at 662–63 (“[E]very presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of 
a legislative enactment; and a statute will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity 
appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of 
the Constitution.”). 
 118. See Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 259 (“A statute or ordinance is presumed 
constitutional and the challenging party has the burden to ‘negat[e] every reasonable basis that 
might support the disparate treatment.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Racing Ass’n of 
Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2004)); Myers, 145 So. 3d at 327 (“An 
ordinance, like a state statute, is presumed to be constitutional.”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 747–
48 (“A zoning ordinance is presumed valid. . . . The legislative body is vested with broad 
discretion and the appellate court cannot interfere unless it is shown that the legislative body 
has acted arbitrarily. . . . If the council's action is fairly debatable, the court cannot substitute 
its opinion.” (citations omitted) (first citing Deacon v. City of Laude, 294 S.W.2d 616, 624 
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Iowa’s rational basis test is so deferential that it stretches the bounds of the rational 
basis test: “For legislation to be violative of the Iowa Constitution under the rational 
basis test, the classification must involve ‘extreme degrees of overinclusion and 
underinclusion in relation to any particular goal.’”119 Unlike those courts striking 
down restrictive definitions of family, courts upholding restrictive definitions find a 
legitimate governmental interest.  
Reading cases upholding restrictive definitions of family, one starts to feel that 
they have “heard the song before.” In evaluating whether a definition of family is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, state courts often fail to even evaluate 
whether the interest advanced is related to the definition of family.120 Courts often 
justify restrictive definitions by quoting from Belle Terre that “every line drawn by 
a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included.”121 Nevertheless, 
the line drawn may focus on the presumed permanency of related and unrelated 
households.122 Some courts, however, leave the door open to what they consider 
functional families.123  
                                                                                                                 
 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1956); and then quoting Vatterott v. City of Florissant, 462 S.W.2d 711, 713 
(Mo. 1971)); Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 769 (“The validity of a zoning ordinance will be 
presumed in the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence to the contrary.”) (quoting Gas ‘N 
Shop, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 539 N.W.2d 423 (Neb. 1995)); McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 662–
63 (“‘A municipal ordinance is a legislative enactment and is presumed to be constitutional. . 
. . [A] statute will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as 
to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution.’” 
(citations omitted) (first quoting Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 412 S.E.2d 424, 425 (S.C. 
1991); and then quoting City of Rock Hill v. Harris, 705 S.E.2d 53, 55 (S.C. 2011)). 
 119. Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 
675 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2004)).  
 120. See Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 750–52; Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 68; McMaster, 395 
S.C719 S.E.2d. at 664–65. 
 121. Dinan, 595 A.2d at 871; Myers, 145 So. 3d at 335; Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 750; 
Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 766; McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 664; City of Brookings v. Winker, 
554 N.W.2d 827, 831 (S.D. 1996).  
 122. See Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n, 736 N.W.2d at 261 (“[A]lthough related persons may 
live together in large numbers, they normally live together in a more permanent status and 
remain in one place for a longer period of time.”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 748–49 (“To 
approximate a family relationship, there must exist a commitment to a permanent relationship 
and a perceived reciprocal obligation to support and to care for each other . . . . Only when 
these characteristics are present can the conceptual family, perhaps, equate with the traditional 
family. In a traditional family, certain of its inherent attributes arise from the legal relationship 
of the family members. In a non-traditional family, those same qualities arise in fact, either by 
explicit agreement or by tacit understanding among the parties.”). 
 123. See Dinan, 595 A.2d at 870–71 (stating “the five persons who occupy one floor of the 
plaintiffs' two-family house may well constitute a single housekeeping unit . . . an issue we 
need not decide” and “[o]ur determination in Part I that the restriction of ‘family’ use of a 
dwelling to occupancy by a traditional family of related persons is not invalid as applied to the 
plaintiffs and that the ten persons presently occupying the property do not qualify as such a 
family makes it unnecessary to address this issue, because the plaintiffs cannot prevail in this 
case whether or not relief may be available”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 748–49 (“In a traditional 
family, certain of its inherent attributes arise from the legal relationship of the family members. 
In a non-traditional family, those same qualities arise in fact, either by explicit agreement or 
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Challengers of local government regulation in these cases often fail to raise 
“winnable” arguments. Claims based on equal protection and privileges and 
immunities clauses invite an unfavorable judgment as those doctrines focus on the 
distinction between the groups, which courts often frame as families and non-
families.124 Others fail to frame their challenges under a specific constitutional 
provision.125  
C. Observations 
Outcomes of both the federal and state cases necessarily depend on the facts 
presented to the court and the nature of the local ordinance at issue. In general, 
though, the cases suggest courts will protect, or at least can find reasons to protect, 
true functional families—particularly when they find it irrational to distinguish 
between related families and unrelated functional families.  
The Supreme Court has not dealt squarely with whether a functional family may 
cohabitate in violation of a restrictive zoning code. Both Justice Marshall, dissenting 
in Belle Terre, and Justice Stevens, concurring in Moore, suggested that they would 
have extended rights granted in those cases to functional families.126 In Justice 
Marshall’s view, even the college students challenging the local ordinance should 
have received protection; a more intentional arrangement like the functional family 
would have merited such protection even more clearly. Justice Stevens, similarly, 
cited caselaw at the state and federal levels that supported protection for, among other 
arrangements: a half-dozen priests, a group home, two unrelated college students, 
four unrelated young men, an indeterminate number of elderly women, and others 
seeking to cohabitate. Of course, neither of these Justices wrote the majority opinion 
in the respective cases.  
In parsing the language, however, it seems possible and even likely that a modern 
Supreme Court would protect a true functional family. The liberal justices may, like 
Justice Marshall, find a social justice element in expanding the zoning definition of 
family. The conservative justices may find that such an expansion can help protect 
the property rights and freedom of association they value. In the meantime, lower 
level federal courts seem reluctant to get involved. For example, a Connecticut 
district court rejected the attempt by the Scarborough 11 to federalize their claim of 
                                                                                                                 
 
by tacit understanding among the parties.”). 
 124. See Dinan, 595 A.2d at 865 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the 
state equal protection and due process clauses); Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 
236, 237 (Ind. 2003) (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the state equal 
privileges and immunities protection clause); Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 257 (challenging 
the zoning ordinance as a violation of the federal and state equal protection clauses); Myers, 
145 So. 3d at 332 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation his and his potential tenants’ 
rights under the state equal protection clause, due process, and association clauses); Winker, 
554 N.W.2d at 828 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the state equal 
protection clause).  
 125. See, e.g., Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706, 709–10 (N.H. 1975); 
Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 748–49. 
 126. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520 (1977) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
2020] ZONING FOR FAMILIES  27 
 
discrimination before granting a motion to reopen the case, which has since been 
withdrawn.127  
State courts, as we have learned, have more squarely addressed the functional 
family. Several state courts have declared limitations on unrelated people to be 
unconstitutional when applied to functional families.128 There may be a few reasons 
why there are not more state decisions holding similarly. First, it appears that few 
cases rise to the appellate level in state courts or are even brought challenging 
restrictive definitions of family.129 Indeed, cases from fewer than twenty states are 
cited in this Article, despite an exhaustive search. Second, cases presented to 
appellate courts usually involve landlords, college students, or other individuals not 
living as a functional family. Courts will not generally declare the ordinances 
unconstitutional as applied to these groups. Moreover, many of the courts upholding 
limits on unrelated household members have refused to entertain hypothetical or 
facial challenges to the ordinances.130 As noted above, some courts that have upheld 
restrictions as applied to particular groups have left open the possibility to reject them 
when applied to a functional family.  
State judicial decisions protecting functional families are generally rooted in the 
rational basis review associated with the right to due process. The most prominent 
exception to this general rule is City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,131 the California 
Supreme Court decision that struck down, after a strict scrutiny review, an ordinance 
that infringed the right to privacy. Yet the legal scholar who has most directly and 
recently weighed in on the question of the functional family in zoning, Rigel Oliveri, 
suggests that legal protections for functional families are best supported by 
arguments for the rights of privacy and intimate association.132 She argues that 
definitions of the “functional family” are problematic because they “create[] the 
potential for a tremendous invasion of privacy.”133 Although her paper on this topic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. De La Torre, supra note 3 (“U.S. District Judge Janet C. Hall initially ruled in the 
city's favor and dismissed the suit on Oct. 14, ruling that the Scarborough Street clan, 
embroiled in a bitter zoning fight with city officials, had not exhausted all local options before 
raising a constitutional challenge in federal court. But Hall, in a move that gave the plaintiffs 
hope, said she would reconsider the case if they could prove why seeking a variance from the 
city would have been futile. They apparently succeeded. On Tuesday, Hall granted the 
Scarborough 11’s motion to reopen the case.”). 
 128. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 129. One may also query whether the lack of appellate cases indicate a correlation between 
zoning enforcement and traditionally marginalized groups with fewer resources and political 
power.  
 130. See, e.g., City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge v. Myers, 145 So. 3d 320, 
330–31 (La. 2014); Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 260–62 (Iowa 
2007); McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 719 S.E.2d 660, 664 n.6 (S.C. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
 131. 610 P.2d 436, 439 (Cal. 1980).  
 132. Rigel C. Oliveri, Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choose 
Household Companions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1401, 1434–35 (2015); see also Kate Redburn, Note, 
Zoned Out: How Zoning Law Undermines Family Law’s Functional Turn, 128 YALE L.J. 2412 
(2019) (a student note dealing with similar issues and framing zoning laws excluding families 
against family law).  
 133. Oliveri, supra note 132 at 1435. She goes on to say, “Simply broadening the definition 
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delves deeply into many important issues, I remain skeptical that courts or 
communities are ready to do what her argument implies, which is to cast aside most 
or all regulations governing how people associate with each other within their 
homes.134 Her work might be seen as an extension of the work of Rebecca Brown 
and Kenji Yoshino.135 They have suggested that we should view government 
infringement on important rights (including privacy and due process) in terms of the 
extent to which it deprives someone of their liberty.136 While this idea has proven to 
be popular among academics, it may be ahead of its time, at least in the zoning arena. 
Few courts seem to be ready to declare liberty, intimate association, or privacy as 
supreme over a community’s right to govern who lives within the community. And 
no courts in my research have gone so far as to uphold challenges to zoning codes 
by groups of people who do not function at least in some ways as a single 
housekeeping unit. In other words, courts are still looking to the identity of the 
plaintiffs and the nature of their relationships in deciding zoning cases involving 
household units. Group of friends, or assemblies of roommates aiming to save 
money, need not apply.  
There is a lot more to say on these points, but what struck me most is that it seems 
that at least some of the goals of these scholars can be achieved, even by courts who 
want to avoid expanding (or creating more) constitutional rights. I make three 
suggestions. First, we should focus exclusively on the functional family. Courts have 
already begun to recognize that the functional family has no distinct land use effects 
from the traditional related family. But not all courts have done so, so there is room 
for progress. Second, we should focus on exclusion, rather than regulation. No court 
has said that functional families should not be regulated; to the contrary, many of the 
courts striking down zoning challenges have recommended alternative ways to 
regulate for potential land use effects of these groups. Fighting for the absence of any 
regulation on liberty or other grounds seems futile—again, at least at this point in 
time. Third, we must spend more time thinking about the rational basis inquiry: 
whether zoning that excludes functional families is rational. This inquiry cuts across 
                                                                                                                 
 
of family fails to question how local governments can use zoning to prevent people from living 
together based on their relationship to one another in the first place. These reforms require 
courts and zoning boards to make value judgments about whether particular households are 
acceptable family substitutes and to condition their ability to live together on how they 
measure up. While this approach allows more groups to live together than a restrictive regime, 
it still does violence to the concept of associational rights.” Id.  
 134. See id. (saying that zoning regulations on household composition do “violence to the 
concept of associational rights. If it means anything, the right to choose household companions 
must protect all people who wish to live together—or coreside—regardless of their identities, 
relationship, or reason for doing so”).  
 135. Oliveri does not cite this work in her article.  
 136. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750, 
760 (2011) (observing that the Supreme Court has “opened doors in its liberty jurisprudence” 
and citing to the 1973 decision in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno as an example of 
rational basis review); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 
1500 (2002) (observing the “striking preference” in the Supreme Court for claims of equality 
over claims of liberty, and urging courts to “employ the lessons from equality jurisprudence 
to . . . the protection of liberty”). I have not fully explored their views in this paper, though I 
suggest zoning for families as a fertile topic of exploration in that context.  
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most analyses of constitutional rights, including the due process clause analysis that 
has been most commonly used to strike down restrictive definitions of family and to 
allow functional families. With that in mind, we turn now to Part III, which will flesh 
out the argument, in the way no court has yet done, that excluding functional families 
fails the rational basis test.  
III. IS EXCLUDING FUNCTIONAL FAMILIES RATIONAL?  
The question on which the exclusion of functional families seems to hinge on 
most—no matter what constitutional claim is made—is whether excluding the 
functional family is rational.137 Published judicial decisions cited in Part II have 
already held that it is not rational for the law to distinguish between groups of people 
who function like a family and groups of people who do not.138 Corresponding with 
this judicial trend is the fact that a growing number of communities have determined 
that the land use effects of functional families do not significantly differ from the 
land use effects of families, as traditionally defined. These communities have written 
or revised their ordinances to allow for functional families, as described in Part I.  
Might excluding functional families be irrational for reasons other than the land 
use impact? This Part draws from sociological and anthropological literature 
demonstrating the rapid diversification in family structure since many zoning codes 
were written. In other words, there is a growing preference to live in configurations 
that depart from those anticipated by the traditional zoning code definition of family.  
In the late 1950s, around two-thirds of children were raised in married-couple, 
male-breadwinner households.139 However, the ubiquity of this “nuclear family” 
arrangement has been in decline for decades. As of 2012, only 22% of children lived 
in married, male-breadwinner families.140 A wide variety of alternative family 
structures have gained ground. In 2012, 12% of children lived with a formerly 
married mother, 11% with a never-married mother, 7% with a parent cohabitating 
with a nonparent, 4% in a married-couple, female-breadwinner household, 3% with 
a single father, and 3% with grandparents only (small percentages also lived in 
married-couple households with both parents unemployed or with neither biological 
parents or grandparents).141 The largest group of children, around 34%, lived with 
dual-earner, married parents (up from only 18% in 1960).142  
Traditional two-parent households are being supplanted by a multiplicity of new 
arrangements. In 1960, 73% of all children lived with two parents in their first 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. I focus on exclusion here, not the extent of regulation, for reasons described in the 
preceding paragraph.  
 138. After a diligent search, I have been unable to find studies showing that functional 
families cause real estate property values to decrease or other harms. Another point of 
reference: there have been no nuisance citations or police activity on the property occupied by 
the Scarborough 11. 
 139. PHILLIP COHEN, FAMILY DIVERSITY IS THE NEW NORMAL FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2 
(2014), https://contemporaryfamilies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/new-normal-family 
-diversity.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8X9-T6HJ]. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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marriage—that number declined to 61% by 1980 and had further shrunk to a mere 
46% in 2014.143 Children are increasingly born to mothers who are single or living 
with a non-marital partner, as is the case for fully four-in-ten born today.144 
Nonmarital cohabitation and divorce,145 together with the prevalence of nonmarital 
re-coupling and re-marriage,146 have resulted in an unprecedented level of fluidity 
and blending in family structure. A recent U.S. Census study found that between 
2008 and 2011, 31% of children under 6 years old experienced a change in their 
family/household structure (i.e., at least one entrance or exit of a parent or parent’s 
cohabitating partner).147 As of 2015, 62% of all children lived with two married 
parents (an all-time low), and a sizeable 26% lived with only one parent (up from 
22% in 2000 and 9% in 1960).148 While around 7% of children currently live with 
cohabitating parents,149 estimates suggest that a much larger proportion (perhaps as 
high as 39%) may experience a bout of maternal cohabitation with a nonparent by 
the time the child turns 12.150 A study based on 2002 National Survey of Family 
Growth data concluded that about 20% of children born within a marriage and 50% 
of children born within a cohabitating, nonmarital union will experience the breakup 
of their parents by age 9.151  Interestingly, the prevalence of multigenerational 
households is also on the rise, driven by a growing immigrant share of the 
population.152 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA: OUTLOOK, WORRIES, ASPIRATIONS ARE 
STRONGLY LINKED TO FINANCIAL SITUATION 15 (2015), 
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 145. See Sheela Kennedy & Steven Ruggles, Breaking Up is Hard to Count: The Rise of 
Divorce in the United States, 1980–2010, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 587, 587–98 (2014) (arguing that 
there was a substantial increase in age-standardized divorce rates between 1990 and 2008).  
 146. See GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., FOUR-IN-TEN COUPLES ARE SAYING 
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 147. LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A CHILD’S DAY: LIVING ARRANGEMENTS, 
NATIVITY, AND FAMILY TRANSITIONS: 2011 (SELECTED INDICATORS OF CHILD WELL-BEING) 
12–14 (2014), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo107044/p70-139.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DG2Z-XF62]. 
 148. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 16; see also id. at 25 (40 percent of families 
with children under 18 at home include mothers who earn the majority of the family income).  
 149. Id. at 18.  
 150. Sheela Kennedy & Larry Bumpass, Cohabitation and Children’s Living 
Arrangements: New Estimates from the United States, 19 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1663, 1680–83 
(2008).  
 151. Id. at 1684–85.   
 152. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RETURN OF THE MULTI-GENERATIONAL FAMILY 
HOUSEHOLD 1 (2010), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/03/18/the-return-of-the-multi 
-generational-family-household/ [https://perma.cc/QET9-PG76] (locate the “Report 
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The unified, nuclear family arrangement is no longer the norm. The new norm is 
diversity and a great deal of flux emanating from the expanding variety of pathways 
and transitions in and out of family arrangements.153 As stated by Philip Cohen, a 
sociologist specializing in the area of household and family structure, “In sum, the 
dominant married-couple household of the first half of the twentieth century was 
replaced not by a new standard, but rather by a general increase in family 
diversity.”154  
There are a number of factors that have played a role in the appearance of 
increased variety, complexity, and fluidity among family arrangements in the United 
States. According to Cohen, the fanning out of family structures has been driven by: 
(a) technological innovations that concurrently reduced the difficulty of household 
tasks and allowed for women to control the timing and number of their births—thus 
boosting female market employment and giving women freedom within, and also 
from, their families; (b) the creation of pension and welfare programs post-
Depression (e.g., social security & welfare support for children) that provided 
opportunities for people to structure their lives more independently of family 
members and other relatives; and (c) market forces that increased the ability of 
middle-class and educated women to delay, forgo, or leave marriage, while spurring 
on falling wages and job insecurity among less-educated men—making them risky 
as potential marriage partners.155 The rise of family diversity has tracked with a 
marked growth in educational attainment and labor force participation, and 
substantial decline in marriage and fertility rates, among American women over the 
last fifty years.156   
The rise of cohabitation among people outside of the “traditional” family may 
also result from feelings of loneliness in modern society. In his seminal work, 
Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam argues that Americans are increasingly 
disconnected and lonely due to an erosion of social capital.157 Others have 
advanced similar arguments in recent years, such as Sherry Turkle’s critique of 
technology’s disintegrating effects on social bonds in Alone Together.158  
While the question of whether Americans are truly lonelier today than ever 
before is highly debated,159 the dangers of loneliness are becoming increasingly 
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 156. See id. at 6. 
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COMMUNITY (2000).  
 158. SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND 
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (3d ed. 2017).  
 159. See ERIC KLINENBERG, GOING SOLO: THE EXTRAORDINARY RISE AND SURPRISING 
APPEAL OF LIVING ALONE 57–59 (2012) (arguing that on average solo dwellers are deeply 
engaged in civic and social life rather than being lonely and isolated); see also CLAUDE S. 
FISCHER, STILL CONNECTED: FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN AMERICA SINCE 1970, at 98–99 (2011) 
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emotional connectedness, has changed relatively little since the 1970s); Claude S. Fischer, 
Comment, The 2004 GSS Finding of Shrunken Social Networks: An Artifact?, 74 AM. SOC. 
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clear through recent scientific research. The influence of social isolation on risk 
of death is comparable to other well-established risk factors such as smoking and 
actually exceeds risk factors like obesity and physical inactivity.160 Loneliness has 
been proven to spur on inflammation, which is linked to conditions like coronary 
heart disease, type 2 diabetes, arthritis, and Alzheimer’s disease.161 Beyond 
increased risk of chronic disease and mortality,162 loneliness is also “characterized 
by impairments in attention, cognition, affect, and behavior.”163 Psychologist 
Abraham Maslow posited that most “maladjustment and . . . more severe 
psychopathology” resulted from a failure to fulfill the human need to belong.164 
The bottom line: feelings of loneliness and social isolation have been proven to 
adversely impact health outcomes. Flexible and communal living arrangements 
may be more socially supportive and may combat our collective loneliness 
problem.  
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* * * 
Family arrangements are becoming substantially more diverse, and individuals 
are choosing to cohabitate at a higher rate than ever before. Yet, America’s housing 
stock has not caught up with the times. In 1940, around 64% of the country’s housing 
stock consisted of detached, single-family homes.165 This undoubtedly reflected the 
dominance of the nuclear family and relatively low proportion of Americans living 
alone (only 7.8% of total households at the time).166 In an era of a wide diversity of 
family arrangements and high number of single-person households (28% of total 
households), how much ground has the detached, single-family home lost?167 
Surprisingly—none. In 2013, the American Housing Survey reported that just over 
64% of the country’s housing stock consisted of detached, single-family homes.168 
Communities across the country must fill these detached homes with people who 
want to live in them—a challenge if that housing is restricted to just the nuclear 
“family.”  
In this new era of family diversity, local governments must examine how zoning 
codes—often written many decades ago, during the dominance of the nuclear family 
—can be updated to accommodate the diverse family structures people want and 
need. To refuse to do so would be irrational in the face of these clear trends.  
IV. POSSIBLE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
If it is irrational and thus unconstitutional to exclude functional families, as 
judicial and demographic trends suggest, local governments must ensure their zoning 
codes accommodate them. To achieve this goal most directly, a local government 
can strip its zoning code of all regulation of household composition: say, deleting the 
definition of family, the concept of the housekeeping unit, and any maximum 
occupancy standards. Eliminating all regulation of the household would satisfy those 
scholars who prioritize liberty or the right of intimate association.169 Yet it would 
dissatisfy many others, and it would be unlikely to be adopted given entrenched 
expectations of the people to whom decision-makers are politically accountable. 
(Indeed, I know of no zoning code that takes this approach.)  
If we assume, then, that governments will choose to regulate for the functional 
family, then governments must identify the goals of regulation. Three come to mind: 
controlling density, protecting privacy, and ensuring compatibility with community 
character. No rule can achieve all of these goals, so communities will have to make 
choices. Three distinct regulatory frameworks highlight these choices: the density 
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model, the privacy model, and the character model. Because we have already 
discussed the privacy and character models in Part I, we will explore the density 
model first here.  
A. The Density Model 
Regulations that prioritize density aim to control the number of people living in a 
particular type or size of dwelling unit, without regulating for character of the 
relationships of members of a household. In that respect, the density model of 
regulations protects privacy and avoids some of the more difficult questions explored 
in this Article. There is no need to define family, nor grapple with the question of 
how many unrelated people may constitute a household. Zoning officials need not 
ask for evidence of legal bonds or proof of voter registrations. Households need not 
submit applications with affidavits stating that they dine together or share a bank 
account.  
While there may be benefits to this approach, I know of no jurisdiction that 
exclusively regulates on the basis of density. There may be significant practical 
barriers for doing so. For one thing, the density model infringes on personal choice 
in that it requires households to maintain membership below a maximum number—
whether households consist of related or unrelated persons. For this reason, these 
regulations may be vulnerable to constitutional challenges. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has never said that density restrictions for related people are acceptable. In Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland,170 the most recent case to deal with the issues of families in 
zoning, the Court invalidated a zoning rule prohibiting certain related people from 
living together. Whether this could be read as an absolute bar to regulating families 
is debatable and may depend on a number of factors. Chief among those factors may 
be whether the nature of the density-controlling regulation implicates some broader 
value. Moore could not be read as a bar to occupancy limits that threaten the health 
or safety of the occupants. For reasons explained in the next paragraph, however, it 
may be hard to set an occupancy limit that satisfies this criteria. For his part, Justice 
Marshall, dissenting in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, recommended that cities 
categorically limit the number of adults (whether related or unrelated) living in a 
single household to achieve density-limiting goals while avoiding running afoul of 
the equal protection clause.171 He suggested limiting each household to a specific 
number of adults, placing controls on rent, or limiting the number of vehicles per 
household.172 State courts have also suggested density controls in lieu of character 
model regulation.173  
There are practical reasons as to why density controls may not work. Let’s take 
the Scarborough 11 as an example. The house they occupy is about 5800 square feet 
in size, and maybe six bedrooms. If what neighbors really wanted to see was more 
like five people in the house, the rule would have to limit density to one person 
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maximum per 1100 square feet, and one person per bedroom up to five. How would 
neighbors in more densely packed neighborhoods—say, downtown—fare in a 
density model? Applying the rule to downtown Hartford, where the average 
apartment may be closer to 800 square feet, would mean that most apartments would 
be single occupancy. However, such a limitation would fly in the face of what we 
have seen in practice, which is that people “double up” in the more expensive housing 
downtown. At the same time, in small units across the city—in our “triple deckers” 
or “perfect sixes”—there would be significant discrepancies between permitted 
density and actual density.  
Yet setting the square footage lower to a more reasonable 400 square feet, say, or 
three people per bedroom, would allow for fifteen people to occupy the house at 
Scarborough using the square footage formula and eighteen using the per-bedroom 
formula. Meanwhile, building and housing codes—perhaps most likely to satisfy the 
rational basis test—hover around maximum occupancies of one per seventy square 
feet. At the Scarborough 11 house, eighty-three people could shack up if that formula 
were applied in Hartford. While the Scarborough 11 house is about twice as large as 
the average new house in the United States (around 2700 square feet)174, it helps to 
illustrate the practical problems with a density model approach.  
There are equity issues, too, with a density formula. Tying density to a number of 
kitchens, bathrooms, or square feet (of the dwelling unit or of the site) means that 
wealthy people can have more people in their household than poor people can.  
In sum, there is no perfect way to simply limit the number of adults living in a 
particular type or size of dwelling. There are trade-offs for communities seeking to 
regulate for families by eliminating the definition of family and adhering strictly to 
a density formula.  
B. The Privacy Model 
The vast majority of jurisdictions addressing the functional family have chosen to 
do so through a privacy model. As discussed through examples in Section I.B.1, a 
privacy model prioritizes privacy. It generally establishes a broad, loose definition 
of a household without requiring a functional family to submit an application to be 
considered as such. There are no public hearings or proof in advance of relationships 
among members of a household. In a privacy model jurisdiction, density may be 
constrained by limitations on the number of unrelated persons that may constitute a 
household.  
I acknowledge here that the name of this model may be misleading in that the 
density model approach may protect privacy better than the so-called privacy model, 
given that the density model only asks questions about the number of persons in a 
household, rather than their relationships with one another. But in any regulatory 
regime—including the density model—privacy of individual households will be 
constrained. There will always be an inherent tension between the desire to allow for 
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flexible living arrangements and the desire to have some limitations on household 
composition.  
C. The Character Model  
Finally, there are some jurisdictions that have chosen the character model. As 
discussed through examples in Section I.B.2, a character model sets forth regulatory 
requirements for the functional family focusing on the nature, length, and depth of 
their bonds. This approach protects the character of the community by delving deeply 
into individual households through a public process exposing information about 
them. In that sense, privacy is obliterated in favor of community character. 
Communities choosing this approach would need to ensure that the aim and content 
of the regulation was not of a discriminatory character and did not have 
discriminatory intent. They would need a rational basis for the criteria used, they 
would have to have a fair and uniform process, and they would have to have fair and 
neutral decision-makers.  
* * * 
The most important point in this discussion is that unless a jurisdiction declines 
to regulate for household composition or size altogether, there is no way to equally 
achieve the goals of controlling density, protecting privacy, and stabilizing 
community character. There may be other models of regulating for the functional 
family, but I have yet to find any jurisdiction that fails to use either the privacy or the 
character approach. Additionally, I cannot conceive of other paths to allow the 
functional family that satisfy the constitutional constraints of zoning law. 
Communities have to choose, and I hope this Article has highlighted the trade-offs 
among their choices.  
CONCLUSION 
Most zoning codes are fifty years old or older, and few have been significantly 
revised since being adopted.175 Yet, during that same period, how we live our lives, 
how our cities develop, and how we relate to each other have all radically shifted. 
Thus, zoning codes must be modernized to accommodate the way many Americans 
choose to live today.  
Although only a handful of courts have squarely tackled zoning regulation of 
functional families, and few scholars have addressed the issue, it is worth a careful 
study because it presents fundamental questions about the role of law in our private 
lives. Ultimately, I have contended that to avoid constitutional scrutiny, communities 
must allow for functional families. A court reviewing the land use impact of a true 
functional family will see no distinction between the functional family and the 
“traditional” family, and demographic trends have shifted so far from the 
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“traditional” family that it would be irrational to exclude modern familial 
arrangements.  
The vast majority of communities responding to this call will seek to regulate 
functional families by placing restrictions on their ability to locate in particular 
neighborhoods and by requiring satisfaction of certain criteria. In making these rules, 
communities must choose how to prioritize the potentially competing goals of 
density control, privacy, and community character. No community can achieve all of 
these goals while still accommodating fellow community members’ increasingly 
diverse living arrangements and preferences. My guess is that most will opt for a 
model that imposes few up-front requirements on households, while a smaller 
number will choose prospective regulation that requires approvals before functional 
families may locate themselves within a neighborhood.  
Let’s return now to the Scarborough 11. A few months after becoming mayor, my 
husband withdrew the nearly two-year-old zoning enforcement suit that his 
predecessor had filed against the Scarborough 11. Around the same time, I had been 
circulating draft revisions to our zoning code that would have allowed for a limited 
number of “intentional communities” in Hartford using the character model 
approach. The proposed revisions were stymied both by local opposition to 
legitimize the Scarborough 11—and by the Scarborough 11 themselves, who were 
reluctant to subject themselves to external scrutiny. For now, the Scarborough 11 are 
living in legal limbo: not using their property in a manner expressly allowed by the 
zoning code, and yet not being fined or evicted for doing so. I suspect they are joined 
by thousands, if not tens of thousands, of functional families across the country—
and will remain in limbo until the laws catch up.  
 
 
 
